Problem
Repository instructions and external context can contain prompt-injection patterns. Detection can provide useful telemetry and catch obvious attacks, but it cannot prove that content is safe and must not become a substitute for sandbox isolation, credential separation, restricted egress, or output validation.
The integration should also avoid coupling scanning to a specific sandbox driver or to Fullsend's upload lifecycle.
Proposed solution
Add an optional, driver-independent audit scanner at the point where ContainerRunner prepares the exact instruction-bearing context supplied to an implementation agent.
- scan configured project instruction files and skills actually selected for the run
- allow workflow nodes to include externally sourced issue/comment/reference context when appropriate
- emit bounded, typed, redacted findings
- start with
off|audit; keep blocking experimental and explicitly configured
- enforce file-count, file-size, and total-byte limits
The scanner should run outside the sandbox before execution. A second in-sandbox scan is unnecessary unless a driver adds or transforms context after host preparation.
Acceptance criteria
Priority
Lower than runtime isolation, credential separation, egress restriction, and safe-output validation.
Estimate
AI-assisted: 3–5 engineering days for audit mode; evaluation of blocking quality is additional.
Problem
Repository instructions and external context can contain prompt-injection patterns. Detection can provide useful telemetry and catch obvious attacks, but it cannot prove that content is safe and must not become a substitute for sandbox isolation, credential separation, restricted egress, or output validation.
The integration should also avoid coupling scanning to a specific sandbox driver or to Fullsend's upload lifecycle.
Proposed solution
Add an optional, driver-independent audit scanner at the point where
ContainerRunnerprepares the exact instruction-bearing context supplied to an implementation agent.off|audit; keep blocking experimental and explicitly configuredThe scanner should run outside the sandbox before execution. A second in-sandbox scan is unnecessary unless a driver adds or transforms context after host preparation.
Acceptance criteria
offandauditmodes are supported; audit does not alter workflow routing.Priority
Lower than runtime isolation, credential separation, egress restriction, and safe-output validation.
Estimate
AI-assisted: 3–5 engineering days for audit mode; evaluation of blocking quality is additional.