fix: prevent GitHub Actions expression injection via tag name in Release workflow

[igraovac-bsci]

Summary

Fixes a critical GitHub Actions expression injection in the Release workflow (.github/workflows/release.yml).

The Prepare workspace snippet step interpolated the tag name directly into a shell command using expression syntax:

run: .github/workflows/workspace_snippet.sh ${{ env.GITHUB_REF_NAME }} > release_notes.txt

GitHub evaluates ${{ }} before the shell runs, pasting the raw tag name into the command line. Because the Release workflow triggers on v*.*.* tag pushes and tag names can contain shell metacharacters (;, backticks, &&, |, $()), a crafted tag could execute arbitrary commands on the runner — with access to that job's GITHUB_TOKEN and any secrets in the environment.

Fix

Bind the ref name to an environment variable and reference it as a quoted shell variable, so GitHub never substitutes untrusted text into the shell command:

- name: Prepare workspace snippet
  env:
      GITHUB_REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
  run: .github/workflows/workspace_snippet.sh "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" > release_notes.txt

This is GitHub's recommended remediation pattern for untrusted input in run: steps. The value is now passed to the shell at runtime as inert data; metacharacters are treated literally.

Test plan

• Verify the Release workflow still produces release_notes.txt on a normal tag (e.g. v1.2.3).
• Confirm a tag containing shell metacharacters no longer executes injected commands (treated as literal data).

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