Do not file public GitHub issues for security bugs.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability. We'll acknowledge within a few business days and coordinate disclosure with you.
If private reporting isn't available to you, contact
@weilueluo on GitHub and we'll set
up a private channel.
In scope:
- The published
@aexhq/sdkpackage. - The published
aexcommand-line binaries and their signed archives. - The published wire contract under
api/and the crates generated from it. - The agent execution runtime published from this repository, including the builtin agent tools and the boundaries they rely on.
- Hosted aex control-plane vulnerabilities that affect SDK, CLI, or runtime users, even though the hosted implementation source is maintained privately.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies — please report those upstream and link the advisory.
- Findings against
https://aex.devthat require workspace access you weren't authorised to use. - DoS via unbounded inputs that the platform already documents as caller-controlled (run size, prompt size, output retention).
Customers supply no model-provider key. A session names a model with its
creator/model slug, and the hosted service brokers the model request. Do not
place a provider credential in a session request, registered resource, message,
metadata, or file.
Model inputs and responses leave the workspace region when the selected managed
model is served. Review the service's current subprocessor and data-processing
terms before sending regulated data. Public billing behavior is documented in
the billing section of apps/site/content/docs/.
Treat every aex API key as a secret. Keep it out of source control, logs, metadata, exception messages, and support transcripts. Workspace secrets have a metadata-only registry: their values are accepted on write and are not returned after creation. Sessions select secrets by registered name.
Registered MCP servers are customer-trusted remote systems. Their credentials remain subject to the remote provider's security, retention, and revocation policies.
Raw Hands networking is explicit. none denies public-internet access from
tool execution; public_internet permits direct public networking. There is no
customer-visible proxy endpoint or managed-egress virtual-host protocol.
Callers remain responsible for the destinations, requests, and credentials
their sessions use.
File and telemetry downloads return short-lived bearer grants. Anyone holding a grant URL and its required headers can use it until expiry, so do not log, store, or forward either value. Expiry prevents a new request but cannot recall bytes already downloaded.
aex does not inspect, scan, or mask the bytes an agent writes into messages, tool output, telemetry, or files. If a session prints a secret, that secret is part of the resulting customer-visible data. Deciding what an agent may read and emit remains the workspace owner's responsibility.
Public handling guidance is documented in
the authentication, resources, networking, files and limits sections of
apps/site/content/docs/.
Security-sensitive hosted implementation details are maintained privately.