fix(1.AF): engine media plumbing — multi-agent review follow-ups (H1/H2/GC/egress-test/doc-drift)

docs/reference/contracts/sse-event-schema.md

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ export type RunEvent =
 | `agent:tool_call` | An agent invoked a tool. | `nodeId`, `model` (the invoking model — so a tool call is attributable across a failover), `toolId`, `toolInput` (sanitized — no secrets), `attemptNumber?` (1-based, matches `cost:updated`) |
 | `agent:tool_result` | A tool returned. | `nodeId`, `toolId`, `success`, `outputSummary` (truncated for UI), `attemptNumber?` |
 | `agent:file_patch_proposed` | An agent proposed a file change (**gated — no write until the user accepts**; e.g. the VS Code inline-diff review). | `nodeId`, `patches: [{ uri, unifiedDiff }]` (≥1 — an empty proposal is meaningless), `attemptNumber?` |
-| `cost:updated` | A node's token cost was tallied (drives the cost waterfall). | `nodeId`, `model`, `inputTokens`, `outputTokens`, `costMicrocents`, `cumulativeCostMicrocents` (integer micro-cents — canonical unit in [llm-provider-seam.md](../shared-core/llm-provider-seam.md#6-usage)), `mediaUnits?` (1.AF — a **disjoint** media usage axis, never folded into tokens; ADR-0031 A6 / ADR-0044), `attemptNumber?` (1-based **within-chain** FallbackChain attempt — resets per node-retry re-dispatch; **distinct** from `node:*.attemptNumber`, see the [two attemptNumber families](#two-attemptnumber-families) note) |
+| `cost:updated` | A node's token cost was tallied (drives the cost waterfall). | `nodeId`, `model`, `inputTokens`, `outputTokens`, `costMicrocents`, `cumulativeCostMicrocents` (integer micro-cents — canonical unit in [llm-provider-seam.md](../shared-core/llm-provider-seam.md#6-usage); **includes realized media spend**, folded as a disjoint addend per [ADR-0044](../../decisions/0044-media-access-governance-read-media-save-to-cost.md) §3 — the per-unit `Usage.mediaUnits` axis is **not yet a field on this event**, deferred, see [deferred-tasks.md](../../roadmap/deferred-tasks.md)), `attemptNumber?` (1-based **within-chain** FallbackChain attempt — resets per node-retry re-dispatch; **distinct** from `node:*.attemptNumber`, see the [two attemptNumber families](#two-attemptnumber-families) note) |
 | `node:completed` | A node finished successfully. | `nodeId`, `output`, `tokensUsed: {input, output, model?}` (`model` only for LLM nodes), `durationMs`, `selected?` (a `condition`'s chosen target ids — the authoritative branch record checkpoint/resume restores from, 1.R; **may be an empty array** when the condition routes to no branch, dimming all downstream), `attemptNumber?` (1-based **node-retry** dispatch attempt — 1.S; absent ⇒ attempt 1) |
 | `node:failed` | A node failed (TERMINAL — exactly one per node; emitted when the node-retry budget is exhausted, on a fatal / `retry_on`-excluded failure, **or** when a pending retry is abandoned by a cancel or a sibling abort — see 1.S). | `nodeId`, `error: {code, message, retryable, correlationId?}` (`code` is an [`ErrorCode`](#error-code-taxonomy); `correlationId` is a secret-free id joined to the internal log — ADR-0036), `attemptNumber?` (the last attempt, when a retry budget was spent — 1.S) |
 | `node:retrying` | A retryable node attempt failed and the engine will re-dispatch the whole node (1.S, [ADR-0040](../../decisions/0040-node-retry-budget-above-the-chain.md)) — **non-terminal** (the node continues; `node:failed` is the terminal). | `nodeId`, `attemptNumber` (the attempt that just failed, 1-based), `error: {code, message, retryable}` (the `NodeFailure` shape — **no** `correlationId`; that anchors the terminal failure), `delayMs` (backoff before the next attempt) |
@@ -117,8 +117,12 @@ export interface CostUpdatedEvent extends BaseEvent {
   inputTokens: number;
   outputTokens: number;
   costMicrocents: number;         // integer micro-cents (canonical unit defined in llm-provider-seam.md); this attempt, from Relavium's pricing table (never the provider)
-  cumulativeCostMicrocents: number; // integer micro-cents running total for the whole run
-  mediaUnits?: MediaUnitsEntry[];  // (1.AF) a DISJOINT media observability/billing axis — image per-count, audio/video per-second (or a raw token count, unit:'count', for a token-based provider's audio); NEVER folded into the token counts above (ADR-0031 A6 / ADR-0044). Present only when a provider reports media usage (OpenAI audio today; nil otherwise)
+  cumulativeCostMicrocents: number; // integer micro-cents running total for the whole run — INCLUDES realized media spend, folded as a disjoint addend (ADR-0044 §3)
+  // NOTE (1.AF): the per-unit `Usage.mediaUnits` axis (image per-count, audio/video per-second; a token-based
+  // provider's audio rides as unit:'count') is NOT yet a field on this event. Realized media spend already
+  // folds into `cumulativeCostMicrocents`; surfacing the disjoint per-unit counts here needs `MediaUnitsEntry`
+  // relocated to `@relavium/shared` first (run-event.ts cannot import the `@relavium/llm` seam type). Deferred —
+  // see deferred-tasks.md.
   attemptNumber?: number;         // 1-based WITHIN-CHAIN attempt; resets per node-retry re-dispatch — distinct from node:*.attemptNumber (see "Two attemptNumber families")
 }
 

docs/reference/shared-core/built-in-tools.md

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ A tool declaration in YAML has a `type` discriminator:
 | `notify` | Send a native desktop notification (title, body, optional action buttons). | `void` | Lets an agent request attention mid-run without blocking the run. |
 | `mcp_call` | Connect to a registered MCP server and invoke one of its tools by name. | the MCP tool result as JSON | Server resolved from config; see [mcp-integration.md](mcp-integration.md). |
 | `invoke_agent` | Call another agent node in the same workflow by node id, with explicit input. | that agent's output | The dynamic-dispatch mechanism used by orchestrator agents to delegate. |
+| `read_media` | Read a produced/received media asset's bytes by its durable `media://sha256-…` handle (optional byte `Range`), so a media-capable model can consume it inline. | a gated `tool_result` media part (the bytes as an in-flight source under the inline ceiling) | **Scope-set authz** — the requesting `session`/`workspace` must be in the handle's `allowedScopes` ([ADR-0044](../../decisions/0044-media-access-governance-read-media-save-to-cost.md) §1); knowing a sha256 is **not** authorization; read-only (bypasses the action gate), fail-closed `Range`, secret-free `media_scope_denied`. *(Engine-pure policy landed at 1.AF; the host `MediaReadAccess` mechanism + scope population are wired at 1.AH — see [deferred-tasks.md](../../roadmap/deferred-tasks.md).)* |
 
 > **Mandatory guardrails (security tightenings — [ADR-0029](../../decisions/0029-tool-policy-hardening.md)):** `run_command` only executes commands that **exactly match** the workflow's `allowedCommands` allowlist (opt-in glob via `allowedCommandGlobs`; defined under `spec.tools.allowedCommands` — see [workflow-yaml-spec.md](../contracts/workflow-yaml-spec.md#tool-policy-spectools); empty or absent ⇒ disabled). `http_request` is **HTTPS-only**, matches `allowedDomains` by **exact FQDN** (empty/absent ⇒ disabled), and **blocks private/loopback/link-local/metadata IP ranges** — the same vetted SSRF primitive applied to provider base URLs and MCP server URLs ([security-review.md](../../standards/security-review.md)). And `git_commit` is gated behind human approval in automated workflows. All are enforced by the engine, not by convention. `run_command` is the **only** sandboxed shell-exec built-in — there is no separate `run_javascript` tool (sandboxed JS evaluation is the engine's job for `condition`/`transform` expressions, not a callable tool).
 

docs/reference/shared-core/tool-registry.md

@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
 - **Canonical home**: the contract for the engine-side `ToolRegistry` + dispatch in `packages/core` (`@relavium/core`) and the host-injected `ToolHost` capability seam it performs side effects through — workstream **1.T**
 - **Related**: [../../decisions/0037-engine-tool-execution-boundary.md](../../decisions/0037-engine-tool-execution-boundary.md) (the decision), [../../decisions/0029-tool-policy-hardening.md](../../decisions/0029-tool-policy-hardening.md) (the guardrails), [built-in-tools.md](built-in-tools.md) (the tool catalog + the concrete result-bounding / config-only-param shapes), [node-types.md](node-types.md) (the `tool_config` / `agent_config` blocks that carry `parameters` / `input_mapping` / `output_mapping`), [mcp-integration.md](mcp-integration.md) (the MCP tool transport, 2.R), [llm-provider-seam.md](llm-provider-seam.md) (the canonical `ToolDef` the `ToolNormalizer` lowers), [../contracts/sse-event-schema.md](../contracts/sse-event-schema.md#error-code-taxonomy) (`agent:tool_call` / `agent:tool_result` payloads + the `tool_denied` / `tool_failed` codes), [../../standards/security-review.md](../../standards/security-review.md#prompt-injection-posture) (the untrusted-data + SSRF + secret rules), [../../standards/error-handling.md](../../standards/error-handling.md) (the retryable/fatal mapping), [../../decisions/0036-run-loop-substrate-event-bus-and-execution-host.md](../../decisions/0036-run-loop-substrate-event-bus-and-execution-host.md) (the sibling `ExecutionHost` seam + the single event-translation point), [../../decisions/0031-llm-seam-shape-amendment-multimodal-io.md](../../decisions/0031-llm-seam-shape-amendment-multimodal-io.md) (durable media handles)
 
-This page is the **one canonical home** for the tool-execution *contract* — how the engine registers a tool, resolves it, assembles and validates its effective arguments, enforces [ADR-0029](../../decisions/0029-tool-policy-hardening.md)'s guardrails, performs the side effect through the host, bounds the model-facing result, and marks it untrusted. The *why* (the engine↔host boundary, the policy/mechanism split) lives in [ADR-0037](../../decisions/0037-engine-tool-execution-boundary.md); the *tool catalog* (the twelve built-ins, their return shapes, FS scope tiers, and the concrete result-bounding thresholds) lives in [built-in-tools.md](built-in-tools.md). This file is the dry reference its consumers (the 1.T registry, the 1.O `AgentRunner`, the 1.V `AgentSession`, each surface's `ToolHost` wiring) bind to. Where any other doc names a tool-dispatch rule it links here and never restates it.
+This page is the **one canonical home** for the tool-execution *contract* — how the engine registers a tool, resolves it, assembles and validates its effective arguments, enforces [ADR-0029](../../decisions/0029-tool-policy-hardening.md)'s guardrails, performs the side effect through the host, bounds the model-facing result, and marks it untrusted. The *why* (the engine↔host boundary, the policy/mechanism split) lives in [ADR-0037](../../decisions/0037-engine-tool-execution-boundary.md); the *tool catalog* (the thirteen built-ins, their return shapes, FS scope tiers, and the concrete result-bounding thresholds) lives in [built-in-tools.md](built-in-tools.md). This file is the dry reference its consumers (the 1.T registry, the 1.O `AgentRunner`, the 1.V `AgentSession`, each surface's `ToolHost` wiring) bind to. Where any other doc names a tool-dispatch rule it links here and never restates it.
 
-> **The one rule that shapes everything here.** `@relavium/core` has **zero platform-specific imports** (CLAUDE.md rule 5). Eleven of the twelve built-in tools need filesystem / process / network / OS I/O the engine therefore cannot perform. The engine owns **policy + dispatch** (pure); the **mechanism** is injected as a `ToolHost`, the same purity seam as `ResolverCapabilities.readFile` (1.L2) and the injected HTTP transport ([ADR-0018](../../decisions/0018-desktop-execution-and-rust-egress.md)). The TypeScript shapes below are the canonical interface the implementation mirrors.
+> **The one rule that shapes everything here.** `@relavium/core` has **zero platform-specific imports** (CLAUDE.md rule 5). Twelve of the thirteen built-in tools need filesystem / process / network / OS / media-store I/O the engine therefore cannot perform (only `invoke_agent` is engine-internal). The engine owns **policy + dispatch** (pure); the **mechanism** is injected as a `ToolHost`, the same purity seam as `ResolverCapabilities.readFile` (1.L2) and the injected HTTP transport ([ADR-0018](../../decisions/0018-desktop-execution-and-rust-egress.md)). The TypeScript shapes below are the canonical interface the implementation mirrors.
 
 ## The `ToolDef` — a registered tool
 
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ codes by [sse-event-schema.md](../contracts/sse-event-schema.md#error-code-taxon
 | Error | When | Run `ErrorCode` | Class |
 |-------|------|-----------------|-------|
 | `UnknownToolError` | id not an exact match | `tool_failed` | fatal (loop-correctable first) |
-| `ToolPolicyError` | a guardrail / grant denial — `not_granted`, `provider_executed`, `command_not_allowed`, `domain_not_allowed`, `insecure_url`, `gate_required` (the full `ToolPolicyDenyReason` union) | `tool_denied` | **fatal** (never retried) |
+| `ToolPolicyError` | a guardrail / grant denial — `not_granted`, `provider_executed`, `command_not_allowed`, `domain_not_allowed`, `insecure_url`, `gate_required`, `media_scope_denied` (the full `ToolPolicyDenyReason` union; `media_scope_denied` is `read_media`'s scope-set denial, [ADR-0044](../../decisions/0044-media-access-governance-read-media-save-to-cost.md) §1) | `tool_denied` | **fatal** (never retried) |
 | `ToolArgsInvalidError` | effective args fail `parseArgs` / secret-taint | `validation` | fatal (loop-correctable first) |
 | `ToolUnavailableError` | the required `ToolHost` capability is absent (host/config gap, not the model's fault) | `internal` | fatal |
 | `ToolExecutionError` | the host capability threw a non-cancel error (cause kept off the message, for logs) | `tool_failed` | retryable (node budget) |

docs/roadmap/deferred-tasks.md

@@ -222,6 +222,21 @@ Severity is the review's verified rating. Check an item off in the PR that resol
 - [ ] **`save_to` url double-fetch** — a `url`-sourced media part in a save_to output is fetched twice (the
   save_to de-inline + the node:completed emit de-inline; the put dedupes the bytes). Thread one de-inlined
   result into both paths to fetch once. *(low · packages/core/src/engine/engine.ts `#performSaveTo`)*
+- [ ] **Keychain no-raw-key IPC test (ADR-0044 §4 acceptance gate)** — ADR-0044 §4 makes "the keychain bridge
+  never returns a raw key from an IPC command" an **explicit 1.AF test deliverable**, bundled with the media
+  IPC/byte-delivery review surface. That IPC surface is the desktop/Tauri command layer, which is **unbuilt at
+  1.AF** — there is no keychain IPC command to assert against yet — so the test is deferred to the 1.AH host
+  bridge that introduces it. The Node-side keychain seam (ADR-0006) exists, but the *no-raw-key-over-IPC* gate
+  is meaningful only once the IPC command exists. **Owner: 1.AH (the keychain/media IPC bridge).** Recorded so
+  the ADR-0044 §4 acceptance is not silently dropped. *(apps/desktop keychain IPC + a direct test; 1.AH)*
+- [ ] **Surface `Usage.mediaUnits` on `cost:updated` (the disjoint per-unit observability axis)** — ADR-0031 A6
+  / ADR-0044 §3 intend the per-unit media usage (image per-count, audio/video per-second; a token-based
+  provider's audio as `unit:'count'`) to be observable on the `cost:updated` event. Realized media **spend**
+  already folds into `cumulativeCostMicrocents` (D17), but the per-unit **counts** are not surfaced: `CostUpdatedEventSchema`
+  lives in `@relavium/shared`, which cannot import `MediaUnitsEntry` from `@relavium/llm` (the layering forbids
+  shared→llm). Surfacing it requires **relocating `MediaUnitsEntrySchema` to `@relavium/shared`** (llm re-exports
+  it; `UsageSchema` keeps using it) — a seam-shape move that wants its own PR. The canonical docs (sse-event-schema.md)
+  now reflect the current state (field deferred). *(low · @relavium/shared seam move + run-event.ts + agent-turn.ts emit; a later PR)*
 
 > **2026-06-19 — second (Sonnet) review pass on PR #35.** A full re-review (9 dimensions, double-verified)
 > on top of the first review's fixes confirmed **0 blockers/highs in reachable code**; ~17 small fixes

packages/core/src/tools/bounding.ts

@@ -84,6 +84,19 @@ function isPlainObject(value: object): value is Record<string, unknown> {
   return proto === Object.prototype || proto === null;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Byte-free projection of an arbitrary value for an **observability event field** (I3) — strips inline
+ * media base64 (canonical `{ kind:'base64', data }` sources, base64 `data:` URIs) and raw binary buffers
+ * at any nesting, leaving the surrounding structure intact. The symmetric twin of the `outputSummary`
+ * redaction in {@link toText}, exposed for the `agent:tool_call.toolInput` field: a model can emit a
+ * base64 `data:` URI (or a `{ kind:'base64', data }` object) as a tool argument, and that field rides the
+ * event/IPC/log stream (an I3 boundary the emit-time `deInlineMedia` choke point cannot catch, since it
+ * sees only a flat string). Display-only — the dispatch already ran on the real args. Cycle-safe.
+ */
+export function redactInlineMedia(value: unknown): unknown {
+  return redactInlineMediaForText(value, new WeakSet<object>());
+}
+
 function redactInlineMediaForText(value: unknown, seen: WeakSet<object>): unknown {
   if (typeof value === 'string') {
     return isBase64DataUri(value) ? '[base64 data URI omitted]' : value;

packages/core/src/tools/registry.test.ts

@@ -393,6 +393,28 @@ describe('ToolRegistry — config-only params and I/O mapping', () => {
     expect(req?.credentialRef).toBe('ref-1');
     expect(out.events.call.toolInput).toEqual({ query: 'hello world' }); // endpoint/credentialRef stripped
   });
+
+  it('redacts inline media base64 from agent:tool_call.toolInput (I3 — symmetric to the result-side outputSummary redaction)', async () => {
+    // A model can emit a base64 `data:` URI as a free-form string tool argument (here http_request's `body`
+    // and a header value). toolInput rides the event/IPC/log stream (an I3 boundary the emit-time
+    // deInlineMedia choke point cannot catch in a flat string), so the bytes must be redacted there exactly
+    // as the result side redacts outputSummary — the dispatch still ran on the real (un-redacted) args.
+    const dataUri = '';
+    const out = await registry().dispatch(
+      call('http_request', {
+        url: 'https://api.example.com/x',
+        body: dataUri,
+        headers: { 'x-thumb': dataUri },
+      }),
+      ctx({ toolPolicy: { allowedDomains: ['api.example.com'] } }),
+    );
+    expect(out.events.call.toolInput).toMatchObject({
+      body: '[base64 data URI omitted]',
+      headers: { 'x-thumb': '[base64 data URI omitted]' }, // the walk recurses into nested objects
+    });
+    // No fragment of the payload survives anywhere in the event field.
+    expect(JSON.stringify(out.events.call.toolInput)).not.toContain('aGVsbG8');
+  });
 });
 
 /* --- capability availability + execution + cancellation --- */

packages/core/src/tools/registry.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 import { extractHttpsHost } from '@relavium/shared';
 
-import { boundForModel } from './bounding.js';
+import { boundForModel, redactInlineMedia } from './bounding.js';
 import {
   ToolArgsInvalidError,
   ToolCancelledError,
@@ -425,6 +425,13 @@ function sanitizeInput(
       delete out[key];
     }
   }
+  // Redact inline media bytes from every surviving arg value before it becomes `agent:tool_call.toolInput`:
+  // that field rides the event/IPC/log stream (an I3 boundary), and a model can emit a base64 `data:` URI
+  // or a `{ kind:'base64', data }` object as a tool argument. Symmetric to the `outputSummary` redaction on
+  // the result side — display-only, the dispatch already ran on the real args.
+  for (const key of Object.keys(out)) {
+    out[key] = redactInlineMedia(out[key]);
+  }
   return out;
 }